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Abstract. In most cases in a safety analysis the influences of security
problems are omitted or even forgotten. Because more and more systems
are accessible from outside the system via maintenance interfaces, this
missing security analysis is becoming a problem. This is why we propose
an approach on how to extend the safety analysis by security aspects.
Such a more comprehensive analysis should lead to systems that react
in less catastrophic ways to attacks.
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1 Introduction
Embedded systems that influence their environment, like factory control systems,
have to be analyzed for safety to be certified by authorities. Security usually is
not made an issue in embedded systems, because security is often only associated
with data security in systems that store sensitive data. Also through the growing
integration and networking of systems, especially by the Internet, new security
problems arise in previously secure systems.
In this paper an approach will be described for the analysis of safety of a
system considering the influence of security problems on system safety. As can
be seen in recent incidents, like the worm Stuxnet or the attack scenario on
airplane control systems1, there are systems in which security flaws can lead to
catastrophic system failures. These failures could be avoided if the influence of
security problems on system safety is taken into account during the development
of those systems.
In the following a process will be described how to conduct such an anal-
ysis using component fault trees (CFTs) and attack trees (ATs). A CFT will
be extended by ATs which model attacks that can cause events in the CFT.
Furthermore it will be shown how to adapt qualitative and quantitative analysis
methods to such a combined tree.
1 http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2013ams/hugo-teso/
2 Related Work
The basis of this work are CFTs as introduced in [4] and ATs [6]. CFTs are an
extension of fault trees (FTs) with an additional focus on system components and
reusability. A system usually consists of several components which by themselves
can consist of subcomponents. A CFT models one on these components following
the component hierarchy of the system. CFTs model all failure modes of the
component at once. That means a CFT can have more than one top level event.
These top level events are also the outports of a component. The outports of
one component can be connected to inports of other components. Despite these
differences, the same analyses are possible as in a FT. The component-wise
construction of CFTs allows easier modeling of large systems than with FTs.
ATs were introduced by Schneier in [6]. They are similar to FTs concerning
the structure. Instead of the probabilities of occurrence in FTs Schneier used
values like attack costs, probability of success of a given attack and the likelihood
that an attacker will try a given attack. In [5] Mauw et al. describe general rules
for calculating with predicates in ATs to compute the values for the top level
event.
In an analysis using a CFT with events that are caused by attacks that
are detailed in an AT, this leads to the problem how to combine the different
values. Fovino et al. propose in [1] a way how to combine FTs and ATs under
the precondition that probabilities for both are available. Probabilities for attack
events are usually not available. Even if they are available, one has to keep in
mind that attack events are not necessarily stochastically independent as events
in a FT should be.
In [2] we described how safety analysis and security analysis can be combined
in general. We decided to use a hybrid approach for the rating of the events to
avoid the problem of assigning probabilities to security-related events.
3 Analysis Process
In this section it will be described how to conduct a safety analysis using CFTs
considering the influence of security problems on safety of a system. The first
step is to develop a CFT for the system under study. The second step is to extend
this CFT to consider security problems. The resulting tree is used to conduct
qualitative and quantitative analyses.
3.1 Develop Component Fault Tree
The first thing to do for the analysis is to develop a CFT for the system to be
analyzed. Per system component one CFT is modeled. The resulting CFTs are
connected via their in- and out-ports. Out-ports are the top level events of the
respective components. In-ports are basic events coming from other components.
Since a component can have several top level events it can also have more than
one out-port.
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3.2 Extend Component Fault Tree
If the CFTs exist, the next step is to extend it to include security concerns which
influence the safety of the system. To do that, additional information about the
system is needed. Information about the data flow in the system and between the
system and its environment is useful for security analysis because communication
interfaces are preferred targets for an attack. This is why the specifications for
the communication interfaces are also required.
To extend the tree systematically, it is necessary to go through it starting
with basic events searching for events that can also be caused by directed man-
ual interventions. Components that deserve special interest are the ones with
interfaces to the environment of the system as they are the ones that are most
probably attacked. To find out which attacks are possible, the STRIDE clas-
sification is used [3]. STRIDE maps threats to security properties: Spoofing—
Authentication, Tampering—Integrity, Repudiation—Non-repudiation, Informa-
tion Disclosure—Confidentiality, Denial of Service—Availability, Elevation of
Privilege—Authorization. From this list the properties that fit to the system
are analyzed further. Also, communication between two system components that
goes through a channel through the environment has to be taken under special
consideration. No events should be left out from the beginning unless the causes
for that are documented in the tree or in a separate document that is linked to
the tree. In the following, events in a CFT that are caused by internal faults will
be called safety events (the traditional events in a CFT). Events that are caused
by an outside influence on the system will be called security events.
If an event is found that can also be caused by an attack, the tree is extended
by an OR gate to which the previous subtree and the new security event are
attached (see Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. Extension of a CFT.
When the whole tree is analyzed the result is a CFT that contains safety
events as well as security events.
3.3 Qualitative Analysis
After extending the CFT, a qualitative safety analysis can be conducted. The
result of such an analysis are ordered lists of minimal cut sets (MCSs). A cut
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set is a set of basic events which together cause the top level event of the tree. A
cut set is called MCS if it has no subsets that are also cut sets. The first step is
to calculate the MCSs per top level event. The second step is to sort the MCSs
according to their size. The smaller the MCSs, the more critical they are because
lesser basic events have to happen to cause the top level event.
It can also make sense to sort them according to safety events and security
events. Then, one receives three lists of MCSs: MCSs containing only safety
events, MCSs containing only security events and MCSs containing both.
MCSs containing only security events can be seen as more critical than the
rest under certain circumstances. The top level event only depends on actions
from outside the system which cannot be influenced by the current system itself.
The safety of the system depends on attacker capabilities and motivation which
can change over time. Necessary tools become better available and cheaper over
time which can make an attack more probable in the future. Countermeasures
against that can be additional system components that add safety events to
those security MCSs to create mixed MCSs.
The probability for a mixed MCS to cause the top level event has an upper
bound: the probability of the contained safety events. This way the criticality of
security events can be mitigated by safety events with low probability.
The probability of statistically independent safety events is multiplied to
obtain the probability of the top level event. That means, the more statistically
independent safety events a MCS contains the less probable it is to cause the
top level event. With this in mind, adding more events to a MCS increases the
safety of the system without knowing the exact probabilities.
To summarize the qualitative analysis, MCSs containing only one event (sin-
gle points of failure) should be avoided by adding more (safety) events to these
MCSs.
3.4 Quantitative Analysis
If the results from the qualitative analysis are not enough, a quantitative analysis
can be done. The first step here is to assign values to basic events. These can be
probabilities for safety events. For security events, probabilities are not feasible
because statistical data is not available or conditions are changing depending on
attacker capabilities and motivation. Another reason is that events in one MCS
are usually statistically dependent on each other. This is why security events are
rated using a simple ordinal scale like {low, medium, high} or {0,1,2} or some-
thing similar. A high rating corresponds with a high probability of occurrence
and a low rating with a low one. For the creation of the rating different attributes
of an attack can be used, like costs, attacker capabilities, attacker motivation,
simplicity, access difficulty, etc.
The next step is to calculate the compound values for each MCS. For prob-
abilities this means the value for the MCS is the product of all probabilities of
the contained events. (Under the precondition that all events are independent,
which is usually given for safety events.) For the rating of a MCS the minimum
of all ratings of the included events is determined.
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Coming back to our three classes of MCSs: safety, security and mixed. Safety
MCSs have a probability P , security MCSs have a rating R, and mixed MCSs
have a tuple of probability and rating (P,R). P is calculated from the individual
probabilities of the included safety events and R is calculated from the individual
ratings of the included security events.
Each class of MCSs can be ordered by itself. The tuples of the mixed MCSs
can be ordered first by probability or by rating. A complete order is not possible
for all cases (see Table 1).
Table 1. Conditions for an order of mixed MCSs according to two tuples t1 = (P1, R1)
and t2 = (P2, R2).
P1 < P2 P1 = P2 P1 > P2
R1 < R2 MCS1 < MCS2 MCS1 < MCS2 undefined
R1 = R2 MCS1 < MCS2 MCS1 = MCS2 MCS1 > MCS2
R1 > R2 undefined MCS1 > MCS2 MCS1 > MCS2
4 Example
In this section the analysis process from Section 3 is demonstrated by an example
analysis. As example, a part of an adaptive cruise control (ACC) system was
chosen (see also [7]). The analyzed scenario is: vehicle VB follows vehicle VA
and VB drives against VA due to a failure in the ACC.
Four wheel speed sensors provide the own speed of the vehicle to the speedome-
ter (SM). The distance to the other vehicle is provided by front and rear distance
sensors. Each vehicle receives the measured velocity and distance values from the
other vehicle by an antenna component. Distance values and foreign velocities
are used by the communication system (CS) which provides them to the control
logic unit.
From the distance and the velocity the new target velocity is calculated by
the ACC component which then increases or decreases the vehicle speed. The
received distance and the measured one are fused in the CS. The received velocity
is used as is.
In Fig. 2 one can see the high level overview of the CFT model of the ACC.
As an example CFT the front antenna component is highlighted. This CFT con-
tains two top level events: velocity_too_high (the velocity of vehicle VB) and
distance_too_high (the measured distance is higher than the actual distance)
which can cause vehicle VB to drive against VA. Both top level events are di-
rectly caused by safety basic events: the received values from the other vehicle
(white circles).
The CFT is extended by security events (shaded circles). They are additional
causes for the top level events and are connected to the CFT via OR-gates. Both
values (velocity and distance) can be manipulated by an attacker by sending a
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tampered radio signal (transmission of noise) or spoofing the antenna compo-
nent.
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Fig. 2. CFT with security events of the ACC.
In a qualitative analysis of the CFT for the top level event crash_with_VA
82 MCSs were found. 14 MCSs contained only one basic event and 68 contained
two basic events. Single event MCSs or single points of failure are especially
critical and should be avoided by altering the system to add more basic events
into those MCSs.
The classification according safety and security events results in 2 MCSs
consisting of safety events and 14 of security events for MCSs of size 1. Of the
MCSs of size 2, 26 consist of safety events, 12 of security events, and 30 MCSs
of safety and security events.
In Table 2, MCSs of size 1 with elements from the example MCS from Fig. 2
are shown. Table 3 lists the MCSs of size 2 corresponding to the example MCS.
The values for the safety events for the quantitative analysis are taken from [7].
Security events were rated using an estimation for difficulty of access to the
system and difficulty of conducting the attack (high difficulty results in a low
rating). The final rating is the minimum of both values. The resulting rating
values for the MCSs of the example are listed in Tables 2 and 3.
The MCSs in the tables are sorted first by security, mixed and safety MCSs
and then by their rating. Without further knowledge how to compare security
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Table 2. MCSs with one element from the example of Fig. 2.
MCS Event Rating
9 front antenna.tampering velocity value too high high
7 front antenna.spoofing velocity too high medium
8 front antenna.received velocity of VA too high 1.50E-02
ratings and safety probabilities an order considering both security and safety at
the same time is not possible. The results show that the velocity value coming
from the front antenna is critical because it can be tampered with easily and it
can be measured wrong with a high probability. It is even a single point of failure
and can lead to a crash of two vehicles. The other value in the front antenna
component, the distance to the other car, is not as critical as the velocity because
it is measured additionally by the own car. But it is shown that both values can
be manipulated by an attacker and there are no countermeasures in the shown
system design.
5 Conclusion
In this paper the process of an extended safety analysis was shown which con-
siders influences of security problems on the safety of a system. To accomplish
that, CFTs were extended by ATs to model attacks that can cause system fail-
ures. Qualitative and quantitative analysis methods were adapted to the new
combined tree. The problem of the missing or hard to obtain probabilities for
security events was avoided by the use of a hybrid rating scheme: probabilities
for safety events and a simple rating (low, medium, high) for security events.
The resulting analysis should give a more comprehensive analysis of embedded
systems than the classical safety analysis.
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